Cont-Filter-Test: Iran–US Strait of Hormuz Closure Crisis (Live, April 2026)

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi nominally leads; SNSC under Ali Larijani clears; IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi controls military and Hormuz file

• Iranian Delegation (April 2026 Hormuz Crisis) — Composite delegation channeling the contested authority structure post-Khamenei: nominal lead is Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (MFA, conciliatory line); ratification gate is the Supreme National Security Council under Secretary / acting head-of-government Ali Larijani; military and Hormuz-closure decisions are dominated by IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi (former Quds Force commander 1988-1997) and the IRGC Navy. New Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has been named (March 8, 2026) but is reportedly seriously injured or incapacitated; political authority is fluid. Delegation must reconcile Araghchi's 'open strait / negotiate' line with Vahidi's 'no vessel of any nationality' closure declaration.

• critical Secure a verifiable, written extension of the April 8 ceasefire to a permanent halt of US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear, leadership, and critical-infrastructure targets; ceasefire must include explicit Israeli adherence (currently absent from the bilateral track).
• critical Obtain reversal of the Sept 29, 2025 EU/UN snapback sanctions reimposition (Council Decision 2025/1971-1982) and de-listing of CBI, NIOC, and major Iranian banks from OFAC SDN lists; restore SWIFT messaging access; release of frozen FX reserves (estimated $100-120B).
• critical Obtain implicit US recognition of the post-Khamenei leadership succession (Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader, Larijani as effective head of government) by entering binding agreements with their representatives — counters the Trump 'regime change' rhetoric of January 2026.
• important Conditional offer: cap enrichment at 3.67% U-235 and submit any remaining 60% stockpile (post-strike inventory uncertain per IAEA) to chain-of-custody export to Russia, in exchange for full snapback reversal and lifting of secondary sanctions on Chinese oil offtake.
• important Use the Hormuz closure as the principal piece of leverage: full IRGC Navy stand-down and reopening of the strait conditional on the above, with phased verifiable withdrawal of the US Navy blockade line declared during the April 13-18 enforcement window.
• important Restore IAEA inspections under Comprehensive Safeguards (Additional Protocol acceptance contingent on damage assessment of Fordow/Natanz/Isfahan); IAEA has been unable to inspect the attacked facilities since June 2025 and again since Feb 28, 2026.
• nice_to_have Confidence-building measure: return of any Iranian-held US aircrew or personnel from the conflict; parallel humanitarian track on dual-national detainees and the post-strike civilian casualty registry.

• rl-no-zero-enrichment — Will not accept zero-enrichment ('Libya model'); domestic LEU enrichment at agreed levels remains a non-negotiable matter of NPT Article IV sovereignty, even after the strikes.
• rl-no-irgc-restructure — Will not negotiate IRGC structure, leadership (Vahidi/Qaani), or its constitutional role; the IRGC's elevated post-Khamenei authority makes this even more politically untouchable than under the original JCPOA framework.
• rl-no-missile-limits — Will not accept restrictions on conventional ballistic-missile development or inventory — Iran's principal post-strike retaliatory deterrent against Israel and US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
• rl-no-leadership-accountability — Will not accept any framework that requires Iranian acknowledgment of nuclear-weapon intent or that imposes 'accountability' for past Iranian conduct as precondition to relief; the Feb 28 killing of Ayatollah Khamenei is the unaddressed grievance.
• rl-no-unilateral-snapback — Will not accept any restored framework that retains unilateral US or E3 snapback authority outside formal UNSC procedure; the Aug-Sept 2025 E3-triggered snapback is itself a grievance to be redressed.

• critical Secure a verifiable, written extension of the April 8 ceasefire to a permanent halt of US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear, leadership, and critical-infrastructure targets; ceasefire must include explicit Israeli adherence (currently absent from the bilateral track).
• critical Obtain reversal of the Sept 29, 2025 EU/UN snapback sanctions reimposition (Council Decision 2025/1971-1982) and de-listing of CBI, NIOC, and major Iranian banks from OFAC SDN lists; restore SWIFT messaging access; release of frozen FX reserves (estimated $100-120B).
• critical Obtain implicit US recognition of the post-Khamenei leadership succession (Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader, Larijani as effective head of government) by entering binding agreements with their representatives — counters the Trump 'regime change' rhetoric of January 2026.
• important Conditional offer: cap enrichment at 3.67% U-235 and submit any remaining 60% stockpile (post-strike inventory uncertain per IAEA) to chain-of-custody export to Russia, in exchange for full snapback reversal and lifting of secondary sanctions on Chinese oil offtake.
• important Use the Hormuz closure as the principal piece of leverage: full IRGC Navy stand-down and reopening of the strait conditional on the above, with phased verifiable withdrawal of the US Navy blockade line declared during the April 13-18 enforcement window.

• ✓ held rl-no-zero-enrichment
• ✓ held rl-no-irgc-restructure
• ✓ held rl-no-missile-limits
• ✓ held rl-no-leadership-accountability
• ✓ held rl-no-unilateral-snapback

Sec. State + acting NSA Marco Rubio leads; CENTCOM Cmdr. Adm. Brad Cooper present; Sec. Treasury Scott Bessent on sanctions; Sec. Energy Chris Wright on Hormuz; principal authority President Donald J. Trump

• United States Delegation (April 2026 Hormuz Crisis) — Composite delegation reflecting Trump's second-term Iran team: Secretary of State and acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio leads at the principal level; CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper participates in indirect Oman-mediated talks (first introduced February 2026); Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Chairman JCS Gen. Dan Caine signal military options; Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent runs the OFAC and DFC maritime-insurance tracks; Energy Secretary Chris Wright fronts the Hormuz-escort posture. The Israeli line (Netanyahu government) is consulted but not present. Decision authority: President Donald J. Trump, who set the April 8 ceasefire deadline and has publicly opposed 'settling' the conflict.

• critical Achieve verified elimination of all Iranian 60%-enriched uranium — preferably via export to Russia for downblending and fabrication, with chain-of-custody and IAEA seals; the post-Feb 28 strike inventory is uncertain and resolving it is the central non-proliferation deliverable.
• critical Full IAEA Additional Protocol restoration with reinstated cameras at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan; resolution of long-standing access disputes at Turquzabad, Marivan, Varamin; bomb-damage assessment access to all sites struck June 22, 2025 (Operation Midnight Hammer) and Feb 28, 2026.
• critical Complete and demonstrated Iranian stand-down at the Strait of Hormuz: uninterrupted commercial transit for 30 consecutive days, withdrawal of IRGC Navy checkpoint behavior (13 of 14 vessels turned back April 19 must reverse), transparent rules-of-engagement for all maritime forces.
• critical Preserve the operative effect of the Sept 29, 2025 EU/UN snapback (Council Decisions 2025/1971-1982) as enforcement leverage: any relief must be partial, time-bounded, and reversible without new UNSC action; the underlying authority remains with E3 and the US.
• important Sanctions relief sequenced step-for-step against verified Iranian compliance — prefer SRE-style waivers over de-listings; CBI may be considered for limited humanitarian channeling; NIOC and IRGC-affiliated entities remain SDN.
• important Maintain explicit alignment with Israel (which is not at the table but continues independent operations), the E3 (which triggered snapback Aug 28, 2025), and Gulf partners (Saudi/UAE/Bahrain/Kuwait — Iranian retaliatory missiles hit oil and gas facilities in their territory).
• nice_to_have Confidence-building measure: return of any US aircrew or personnel held by Iran (note the F-15E rescue operation referenced in April 6, 2026 reporting), plus dual-national detainees on a parallel humanitarian track.

• rl-no-permanent-60pct — Will not accept any framework that legitimizes Iranian enrichment above 5% U-235; all post-strike 60% material must be eliminated or exported, with verification.
• rl-no-irgc-delist — Will not de-list IRGC, IRGC-QF, or IRGC-controlled front companies from FTO/SDN designations under any circumstances; the IRGC's elevated role under Vahidi makes this even more politically untouchable.
• rl-iaea-access — Cannot accept any framework with access weaker than Additional Protocol plus managed access at military sites where IAEA has open SQs; bomb-damage-assessment access at struck nuclear sites is an explicit precondition.
• rl-snapback-preserved — Will not surrender E3/US ability to invoke snapback under the (now-superseded) UNSCR 2231 mechanism or its successor framework; will not relinquish secondary-sanctions authority.
• rl-no-strike-apology — Will not apologize for, acknowledge as unlawful, or pay reparations for the Feb 28, 2026 strikes that killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the strikes are characterized as preemptive self-defense (per Sec. Rubio remarks of March 3, 2026).

• critical Achieve verified elimination of all Iranian 60%-enriched uranium — preferably via export to Russia for downblending and fabrication, with chain-of-custody and IAEA seals; the post-Feb 28 strike inventory is uncertain and resolving it is the central non-proliferation deliverable.
• critical Full IAEA Additional Protocol restoration with reinstated cameras at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan; resolution of long-standing access disputes at Turquzabad, Marivan, Varamin; bomb-damage assessment access to all sites struck June 22, 2025 (Operation Midnight Hammer) and Feb 28, 2026.
• critical Complete and demonstrated Iranian stand-down at the Strait of Hormuz: uninterrupted commercial transit for 30 consecutive days, withdrawal of IRGC Navy checkpoint behavior (13 of 14 vessels turned back April 19 must reverse), transparent rules-of-engagement for all maritime forces.
• critical Preserve the operative effect of the Sept 29, 2025 EU/UN snapback (Council Decisions 2025/1971-1982) as enforcement leverage: any relief must be partial, time-bounded, and reversible without new UNSC action; the underlying authority remains with E3 and the US.
• important Sanctions relief sequenced step-for-step against verified Iranian compliance — prefer SRE-style waivers over de-listings; CBI may be considered for limited humanitarian channeling; NIOC and IRGC-affiliated entities remain SDN.

• ✗ approached rl-no-permanent-60pct — opponent text approached this red line — review
• ✓ held rl-no-irgc-delist
• ✓ held rl-iaea-access
• ✓ held rl-snapback-preserved
• ✓ held rl-no-strike-apology